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Beyond knowing that:
A new generation of epistemic logics∗
Yanjing Wang
Abstract Epistemic logic has become a major field of philosophical logic ever since
the groundbreaking work by Hintikka (1962). Despite its various successful applic-
ations in theoretical computer science, AI, and game theory, the technical devel-
opment of the field has been mainly focusing on the propositional part, i.e., the
propositional modal logics of “knowing that”. However, knowledge is expressed in
everyday life by using various other locutions such as “knowing whether”, “knowing
what”, “knowing how” and so on (knowing-wh hereafter). Such knowledge expres-
sions are better captured in quantified epistemic logic, as was already discussed by
Hintikka (1962) and his sequel works at length. This paper aims to draw the atten-
tion back again to such a fascinating but largely neglected topic. We first survey what
Hintikka and others did in the literature of quantified epistemic logic, and then ad-
vocate a new quantifier-free approach to study the epistemic logics of knowing-wh,
which we believe can balance expressivity and complexity, and capture the essen-
tial reasoning patterns about knowing-wh. We survey our recent line of work on
the epistemic logics of ‘knowing whether”, “knowing what” and “knowing how” to
demonstrate the use of this new approach.
1 Introduction
Epistemic logic as a field was created and largely shaped by Jaakko Hintikka’s
groundbreaking work. Starting from the very beginning, Hintikka (1962) set the
stage of epistemic logic in favor of a possible world semantics,2 whose rich and
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2 Hintikka was never happy with the term “possible worlds”, since in his models there may be no
“worlds” but only situations or states, which are partial descriptions of the worlds. However, in this
paper we will still use the term “possible worlds” for convenience.
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intuitive structure facilitates in-depth philosophical discussions and an intuitive un-
derstanding of knowledge that leads to various applications in other fields such as
distributed systems and artificial intelligence. In a nutshell, Hintikka’s notion of
knowledge amounts to the elimination of uncertainty. At a given world, the altern-
ative relation induces a split of all the possible worlds: the epistemically possible
ones and the rest. The agent knows ϕ at a world iff the ¬ϕ worlds are ruled out
in its epistemic alternatives according to the agent. In fact, such a semantics also
works for other propositional attitudes that are essentially about information, such
as belief (Hintikka, 2003).
Hintikka (1962) devoted most of the book on propositional epistemic logic with
the following language (call it EL):
ϕ ::=⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | Kiϕ
where Kiϕ reads “agent i knows that ϕ”. The language is interpreted on Kripke
models M = 〈S,{→i| i ∈ I},V 〉 where S is a non-empty set of possible worlds,
→i⊆ S× S and V : P→ 2S. The semantics for Kiϕ is as follows:
M ,s  Kiϕ ⇔ for all t such that s→i t : M , t  ϕ
According to Hintikka (1962), →i should be reflexive and transitive. In many
applications, it is also reasonable to take it as an equivalence relation, which gives
rise to the S5 axiom system, a very strong epistemic logic (Fagin et al, 1995):
System S5
Axioms Rules
TAUT all the instances of tautologies MP ϕ ,ϕ → ψψ
DISTK Ki(p→ q)→ (Ki p→ Kiq) NECK
ϕ
Kiϕ
T Ki p→ p SUB
ϕ
ϕ [p/ψ ]
4 Ki p→ KiKi p
5 ¬Ki p→ Ki¬Ki p
Despite various philosophical debates regarding the axioms 4 and 5, and the
problem of logical omniscience (cf. (Lenzen, 1978)), propositional epistemic logic
has been successfully applied to many other fields because its semantic notion of
knowledge is intuitive and flexible enough to handle uncertainties in various con-
texts. The knowledge modality Ki is in particular powerful when combined with
other modalities such as the temporal ones and the action modalities, which resulted
in two influential approaches which can model changes of knowledge: Epistemic
Temporal Logic (ETL) and Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) (cf. e.g., Fagin et al
(1995); van Ditmarsch et al (2007)). See van Ditmarsch et al (2015) for an overview
of the applications of epistemic logic.
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However, knowledge is not only expressed by “knowing that”. For example, we
often use the verb “know” with an embedded question such as:
• I know whether the claim is true.
• I know what your password is.
• I know how to swim.
• I know why he was late.
• I know who proved this theorem.
• I know where she has been.
In the rest of the paper, we call these constructions knowing-wh: know followed
by a wh-question word.3 The following table shows the number of hits returned
by googling the corresponding terms.4 From the statistics, at least “know what”
Table 1 Hits (in millions) returned by google
X that whether what how who why
“know X” 574 28 592 490 112 113
“knows X” 50.7 0.51 61.4 86.3 8.48 3.55
and “know how” are equally frequent, if not more, as “know that” in natural lan-
guage, and other expressions also play important roles in various contexts. Are those
knowing-wh constructions as theoretically interesting as “knowing that”? Below we
will briefly look at it from three different perspectives of linguistics, philosophy, and
AI.
Linguists try to understand such constructions from a more general perspective in
terms of classifications of verbs: which verbs can take an embedded wh-question?
For example, forget, see, remember are like know in this sense. However, it is a
striking cross-linguistic fact that the verb believe cannot take any of those embedded
questions, in contrast with philosophers’ usual conception of knowledge in terms of
strengthened justified true belief. Linguists have been trying to give explanations in
terms of factivity and other properties of verbs with interesting exceptions (cf. e.g.,
(Egre´, 2008) and references therein). Moreover, when know is immediately followed
by a noun phrase, it can usually be translated back to the knowing-wh constructions
by treating the noun phrase as a concealed question, e.g., knowing the price of milk
can be treated as knowing what the price of milk is (Heim, 1979). The semantic
variability of the same knowing-wh-construction in different contexts also interest
linguists a lot, e.g., “I know which card is the winning card” can mean I know Ace
is the winning card for the game, or I know the card that my opponent holds is the
winning card. There are approaches that give uniform treatments to handle this kind
of context-sensitivity (cf. e.g., Aloni (2001)).
For philosophers, especially epistemologists, it is crucial to ask whether those
knowing-wh statements are also talking about different kinds of knowledge. For
3 How is in general also considered as a wh-question word, besides what, when, where, who, whom,
which, whose, and why.
4 The “knows X” search term can exclude the phrases such as “you know what” and count only
the statements, while “know X” may appear in questions as well.
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example, it has been a frequently debated topic whether knowledge-how can be re-
duced to knowledge-that (cf. e.g., (Ryle, 1949; Stanley, 2011)). As another example,
for philosophers of science, knowing why is extremely important, as it drives sci-
ence forward. However, what amounts to knowing why? Many philosophers think
knowing an scientific explanation is the key to answering why-questions, and there
is a large body of research on it (cf. e.g., (van Fraassen, 1980)). Knowing who also
draws some attention from philosophers in analyzing the more general propositional
attitude ascriptions, see (Boer and Lycan, 2003).
Already in the early days of AI, researchers realized knowing-wh statements are
useful in specifying the precondition or the effects of actions (Moore, 1977). For
example, it is crucial for a robot to know where to check or whom to ask, if it
does not know what the email address of the person it wants to contact. McCarthy
(1979) even considered knowing what as the most important type of knowledge
in AI. Such knowing-wh statements also show up in various implemented AI sys-
tems, e.g., knowledge-based planning system (Petrick and Bacchus, 2004a,b). Be-
sides constructing knowledge bases, it is very handy to specify the goal of a system
using knowing-wh constructions, e.g., knowing whether is used quite frequently to
specify knowledge goals and precondition for actions.
So, what about epistemic logicians? In fact, Hintikka (1962) devoted the last
chapter to “knowing who” in the context of quantified epistemic logic, for the reason
that the agent names are already in the epistemic language that he introduced earlier.
Hintikka believed other knowing-wh constructions can be treated alike with differ-
ent sorts of constants in place.5 In fact he proposed to treat knowing-wh as “one
of the first problems” in epistemic logic (Hintikka, 1989b). The formalism involves
quantifiers that quantify into the modal scope which may cause ambiguity accord-
ing to Quine.6 Hintikka had lengthy discussions on conceptual and technical prob-
lems of quantified epistemic logic and in fact gradually developed a more general
epistemic logic which he called a “second generation epistemic logic” (Hintikka,
2003). However, the quantified epistemic logic did not draw as much attention as
its propositional brother. As a result, the classic textbook by Fagin et al (1995) has
only a very brief discussion of first-order epistemic logic, and in the handbook of
epistemic logic by van Ditmarsch et al (2015), there is not much about quantifiers
either. The only dedicated survey that we found for quantified epistemic logic is
a section in a long paper on epistemic logic by Gochet and Gribomont (2006). It
seems that the mainstream epistemic logicians mainly focus on the propositional
cases. However, not only Hintikka himself did quite a lot of work on it but also
there are fascinating new technical developments in quantified epistemic logic. This
motivates the first part this paper: to give a brief overview on what Hintikka and
others did about epistemic logics of knowing-wh and quantified epistemic logic in
general.
5 Later on he singled out “knowing why” in his framework of interrogative models
(Hintikka and Halonen, 1995).
6 See (Garson, 2001) for a survey on the (technical) difficulties about quantification in modal logic.
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On the other hand, introducing quantifiers explicitly in the epistemic language
has a high computational cost: many interesting quantified epistemic logics are not
decidable. However, there is a way to go around this. In this paper we would like
to propose a general quantifier-free approach to the logics of knowing-wh, which
may balance expressivity and complexity. The central idea is simple: treat knowing-
wh construction as new modalities, just like Hintikka did for knowing that. This
approach can avoid some of the technical and conceptual problems of the quanti-
fied epistemic logic due to its weak language. New techniques and logics are being
developed as will be surveyed in the later part of the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2.1 we survey Hintikka’s
various works on knowing-wh. Section 2.2 reviews the recent technical develop-
ments of quantified epistemic logic. Section 3 explains our new approach and its
considerations. Section 4 gives three concrete examples to demonstrate our ap-
proach. In the last section we conclude with some further directions.
2 Background in quantified epistemic logic
2.1 Hintikka on knowing-wh
According to Hintikka (1989b), one of the most important applications of epistemic
logic is to understand questions.7 A question “Who is b?” amounts to the request of
information: bring about that I know who b is. Hintikka called “I know who b is” the
desideratum of the corresponding question. Under this view, the study of questions
reduces largely to the study of their corresponding desiderata. This interest in the
relationship between questions and knowledge also led Hintikka to the pursuit of
a Socratic epistemology that weighs knowledge acquisition more importantly than
knowledge justification which has been the focus of the traditional epistemology
(Hintikka, 2007).
To formalize “I know who b is” we do need quantifiers. Hintikka (1962) proposed
the formula ∃xK(b = x), and compared it with K∃x(b = x) in order to demonstrate
the distinction between de re and de dicto in the epistemic setting.8 He called the
earlier one knowledge of objects and the later one propositional knowledge. How-
ever, once the constants and quantifiers are introduced into the language, we need
a much richer structure over possible worlds. The possible worlds may not share
the same domain of objects, for you may imagine something non-existent to exist
7 It also makes sense to understand knowing-wh constructions by first understanding the semantics
of questions, see (Harrah, 2002) and references therein. Knowing-wh is then knowing a/the answer
of the corresponding wh-question.
8 Hintikka (1962) argued that the quantification into the modal context is necessary and not mis-
leading, in contrast to Quine who was against such quantification due to the lack of substitution of
identity in modal context.
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in some possible world.9 Now how do we “pick up” an object in order to evalu-
ate the formula “∃xK(b = x)”? Hintikka (1989b) proposed to draw world-lines in
different ways to identify objects across the world. His most important point here
is that depending on how you draw the world-lines, the formulas like ∃xK(b = x)
may have different meanings. For example, ∃xK(b = x) can mean I can visually
identify a person, e.g., in a party scenario I can say I know who Bill is by point-
ing at someone: “just that guy over there!”. According to Hintikka (1989b), this
requires to draw perspectival world-lines to connect the visual images, which can
sometimes be used to interpreted knowing who as acquaintance. On the other hand,
we can draw public world-lines, which contribute to the semantics of knowing who
by description, e.g., I know who Bill is: he is the mayor of this city and a well-know
logician. We can also think that there are two kinds of quantifiers corresponding to
these two ways of drawing the world-lines (Hintikka and Symons, 2003). Since the
formalism of knowing-wh is still based on the knowing that operator Ki, Hintikka
did not consider them as a different type of knowing (Hintikka, 2003).
Besides the simple knowing-wh sentences, there are natural knowing-wh expres-
sions which involve predicates, e.g., “I know who murdered b” can be formalized as
∃xKM(x,b), which is the desideratum of the question “Who murdered b?”. To ful-
fill the desideratum ∃xKM(x,b), is it enough to have KM(a,b) for some a? Hintikka
(1989a) argued that merely knowing that M(a,b) does not always lead to knowing
who: the questioner should also know who a actually is, which is called the conclus-
iveness condition. Indeed, answering the question “Who gave the first speech?” by
“The first speaker.” may not be informative at all. Of course it is debatable whether
this requirement is pervasive in most of the contexts. From this point of view, the
existential generalization rule may not hold: KM(a,b) does not entail ∃xKM(x,b).
It becomes more interesting when complicated knowing-wh sentences are con-
sidered. An example given by Hintikka (2003) is “I know whom every young mother
should trust” (with the intention pointing to “her own mother”). It seems that we
need to pick up the trusted one in a uniform way for each young mother, and thus
∃ f K∀x(M(x) → T (x, f (x))) is a faithful formalization. Actually such knowledge
of functions is pervasive in empirical sciences, where the research can be viewed
as asking Nature what is the (functional) dependence between different variables
(Hintikka, 1999). For example, let x be the controlled variable and y be the observed
variable, and we ask Nature the dependence between x and y by doing experiments
E by changing the value of x. The desideratum of such a question is that I know the
dependence between x and y according to the experiments, which can be formalized
as ∃ f K∀xE(x, f (x)) where E can be viewed as the relation paring the values of x
and y according to the experiments. Like before, merely having K∀xE(x,g(x)) is
not enough, we do need a conclusiveness condition that you know the function g:
∃ f K∀x( f (x) = g(x)). In this way, Hintikka (1996) managed to explain how math-
ematical knowledge, such as the knowledge of certain functions, plays a role in
empirical research.
9 How the domain varies may affect the corresponding quantified modal axioms, see
(Brau¨ner and Ghilardi, 2007) for a overview on this issue in first-order modal logic.
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However, the above discussion leads to the introduction of higher-order entit-
ies, whose existence is unclear (Hintikka, 2003). To avoid this problem, Hintikka
made use of the idea prominent in the Independence Friendly Logic proposed by
Hintikka and Sandu (1989). The idea is to introduce the independence sign “/” into
the logic language to let some quantifiers jump out of the scopes of earlier ones,
in order to have a branching structure of quantifiers which are linearly ordered
in the formulas. For example, ∀x(∃y/∀x)(x = y) is not valid anymore, compared
to ∀x∃y(x = y), since the choice of y is independent from the choice of x. Now
the earlier “young mother” formula becomes K∀x(∃y/K)(M(x)→ T (x,y)) without
the second-order quantification. Likewise, the desideratum of an experiment can
be formalized as K(∀x)(∃y/K)E(x,y). The slash sign not only works with quanti-
fiers but also logical connectives. For example, K(p(∨/K)¬p) expresses knowing
whether p while K(p∨¬p) amounts to knowing a tautology. There is also a beauti-
ful correspondence between the desideratum and the presupposition of the same wh-
question. The desideratum can usually be obtained by adding a suitable slash in the
corresponding presupposition. For example, the presupposition of “Who murdered
b?” is that K∃xM(x,b), i.e., I know someone murdered b, and the desideratum is
K(∃x/K)M(x,b) which is equivalent to ∃xKM(x,b), i.e., I know who murdered b.
Hintikka (2003) called the epistemic logic using such an extended language the
second generation epistemic logic, for it can go beyond the first-order epistemic
logic, although the apparent quantifications are still first-order.10
2.2 Recent technical advances of quantified epistemic logic
The only comprehensive survey on quantified epistemic logic that we found is the
section 5 of a paper by Gochet and Gribomont (2006), which covers most of the
important works up to the beginning of this century.11 Here we supplement it with
some of the recent advances, which are, however, by no means exhaustive.
Most of the recent developments in quantified epistemic logic are application-
driven. To handle cryptographic reasoning, Cohen and Dam (2007) propose a com-
plete first-order epistemic logic with a counterpart semantics in order to model the
indistinguishability of messages modulo one’s decoding ability. To formalize the
reasoning in games, Kaneko and Nagashima (1996) propose a first-order epistemic
logic with common knowledge. Wolter (2000) shows that even very simple frag-
ments of such a FO epistemic logic are not decidable. On the other hand, decidable
fragments are found using techniques by Sturm et al (2000) based on the idea of
monodic fragments of quantified modal logic, where only one free variable is al-
10 The above K∀x(∃y/K)(M(x) → T (x,y)) is an example that cannot be expressed in standard
first-order epistemic logic.
11 For the background of first-order modal logic, the readers are referred to the handbook chapter by
Brau¨ner and Ghilardi (2007) and the book by Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998). For the discussions
on the philosophical issues of quantified first-order epistemic logic, see Holliday and Perry (2014)
and references therein.
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lowed to appear in the scope of modalities. In a similar way, some monodic frag-
ments of first-order temporal logic are proved decidable (cf. e.g., (Hodkinson et al,
2000, 2002; Hodkinson, 2002)). It also inspired Belardinelli and Lomuscio (2011)
to discover useful fragments of FO epistemic temporal logic. FO epistemic tem-
poral logic has also been used to verify security properties as demonstrated by
Belardinelli and Lomuscio (2009, 2012).
In propositional epistemic logic, agent names are like rigid designators and they
actually are indexes of the epistemic alternative relations in the model. However, this
limits epistemic logic to a fixed, finite set of agents. Moreover, agents cannot have
uncertainty about each other’s identity. A natural extension is to allow (implicit)
quantification over agents (Corsi, 2002; Corsi and Orlandelli, 2013; Corsi and Tassi,
2014), where different readings of a quantified modal formula can also be disam-
biguated. Another quantifying-over-agent approach appears in the context of rough
sets with multiple sources (as agents) by Khan and Banerjee (2010).
It is also interesting to quantify over propositions, which leads to second-order
epistemic logic by Belardinelli and van der Hoek (2015, 2016), built on an early
work by Fine (1970). In such a framework, one can express that currently i knows
everything that j knows,12 which was handled earlier in a different approach by
van Ditmarsch et al (2012b).
Recent years also witness the growth of inquisitive semantics as an interdis-
ciplinary field between linguistics and logic. It gives a uniform semantics to both
descriptive and interrogative sentences (cf. e.g., (Ciardelli et al, 2013)). In such a
framework, one can combine knowing that operator with an embedded interrogative
compositionally, and this is how knowing whether is treated in the epistemic inquis-
itive logic (Ciardelli, 2014; Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2015). The readers are referred
to the PhD thesis by Ciardelli (2016) for recent developments.
3 Epistemic logics of knowing-wh: a new proposal
Our point of departure from the aforementioned existing research is that we take a
knowing-wh construction as a single modality, just like K for knowing that, without
explicitly introducing quantifiers, predicates, and equality symbols into the logic
language. For example, instead of rendering “agent i knows what the value of c is”
as ∃xKi(c = x), we simply have Kvic where Kvi is a new knowing what modality.
An example language of knowing what is as follows (to be discussed in detail later):
ϕ ::=⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | Kiϕ | Kvic
where c belongs to a set C of constant symbols.
Following Hintikka, we take a semantics-driven approach for there is usually
not enough syntactic intuition on the possible axioms for such knowing-wh con-
12 Modeling it globally can be done in propositional modal logic with new axioms like K j p→ Ki p,
cf. e.g., Lomuscio and Ryan (1999).
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structions. We can discover interesting axioms by axiomatizing the valid formu-
als w.r.t. the semantics. The models are usually richer than Kripke models for pro-
positional epistemic logic. For example, the semantics for Kvic is given over first-
order Kripke models with a constant domain: M = 〈S,D,{→i| i ∈ I},V,VC〉 where
〈S,{→i| i ∈ I},V 〉 is a usual Kripke model, D is a constant domain of values (all the
worlds share the same D), and VC : C×S→D assigns to each (non-rigid designator)
c ∈ C a d ∈D on each s ∈ S:
M ,s  Kvic ⇔ for any t1, t2 : if s→i t1,s→i t2, then VC(c, t1) =VC(c, t2).
Intuitively, i knows what the value of c is iff c has the same value over all the i-
accessible worlds. This is the same as the semantics for ∃xKi(c = x) on constant
domain FO Kripke models. We will come back to the details in Section 4.2.
After defining the language and semantics, we can try to find a complete axio-
matization with meaningful axioms, and then dynamify the logic to include updates
of knowledge as in dynamic epistemic logic (van Ditmarsch et al, 2007). The ax-
ioms will tell us some intrinsic logical features of the knowing-wh construction. We
may come back to philosophy with new insights after finishing the formal work.
Such an approach has the following advantages:
Neat language and characterizing axioms Using knowing-wh modalities can
make the formal languages very simple yet natural, which can also highlight the
logical differences between different knowing-wh in terms of intuitive axioms,
e.g., knowing whether ϕ is equivalent to knowing whether ¬ϕ . It will also be-
come clear how knowing-wh modalities differ from the normal modalities, e.g.,
knowing how to achieve ϕ and knowing how to achieve ψ does not entail know-
ing how to achieve ϕ ∧ψ (e.g., take ψ = ¬ϕ).
Balancing expressivity and complexity The new languages may be considered
as small fragments of quantified epistemic logic and we can try to balance the
expressivity and complexity. For example, the above Kv modality packages a
quantifier, a K modality, and an equality together. Such a packed treatment is
also the secret of the success of standard modal logic, where a quantifier and a
relational guard are packed in a modality. Such weaker languages are in general
more applicable in practice due to computational advantages. Our approach may
also help to discover new decidable fragments of quantified modal logics.
Avoiding some conceptual problems The history of epistemic logic taught us a
lesson that the logical framework can be extremely useful even before philosoph-
ers reach a consensus on all its issues, if they ever do so at all. Certain conceptual
difficulties about quantified epistemic logic should not stop us from developing
the logic further while bearing those questions in mind, since new insights may
come as you start to move forward. Our weaker languages are free of explicit
quantifiers, thus it may avoid some difficulties in the full quantified epistemic
logic and makes us focus on the limited but reasonably clear fragments.13
13 The absence of equality symbols also make the substitution of equal constants apparently irrel-
evant.
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Connections to existing modal logics As we will see, each of the knowing-wh
logics has some very close (sometimes surprising) friends in propositional modal
logic. We may benefit from the vast existing results and tool support for proposi-
tional modal logic. As we will see, the new operators can also motivate new ways
to update the models which were not considered before.
Of course, there are also limitations and difficulties of this approach:
• The languages cannot express knowing-wh constructions in a fully compositional
way when complicated constructions are involved, e.g., John knows what Mary
knows about logic. Also from the linguistic perspective, our approach cannot
handle context-sensitivity of the meaning of the knowing-wh constructions.14
• Our languages are relatively weak, but the models are very rich in order to ac-
commodate an intuitive semantics. This apparent asymmetry between syntax and
semantics may cause difficulties in axiomatizating the logics. However, we may
restore the symmetry by simplifying the models modulo the same logic once we
have a complete axiomatization w.r.t. the rich models.
• From a syntactic point of view, the new logics are usually not normal, e.g., know-
ing whether ϕ →ψ and knowing whether ϕ does not entail knowing whether ψ ,
for you may know that ϕ is false but have no idea about the truth value of ψ .15
• Although many knowing-wh modalities share a general form of ∃xKϕ(x), differ-
ent modalities can still behave quite differently depending on the exact shape of
ϕ(x). Also, the existential quantifier may not necessarily be first-order as in the
later example of a logic of knowing how.
• In some cases it is highly non-trivial to give a reasonable semantics since we do
not understand enough about the meaning of certain knowing-wh yet.
In the following we give three example studies on knowing-wh to demonstrate the
claimed advantages, and how we overcome some of the technical difficulties men-
tioned above.
4 Examples
In this section, we demonstrate the use and techniques of the proposed approach
with three examples: the logics of knowing whether, knowing what, and knowing
how. Besides the historical background and the common pursuit for complete ax-
iomatizations, each example has its own special focus to give the readers a more
general picture of the approach. The readers may pay attention to the points below.
• Knowing whether: expressivity comparisons over models and frames w.r.t. stand-
ard modal logic, and completeness proof for such non-normal modal logic;
14 See (Aloni, 2016) in this volume for a quantified epistemic logic treatment of this context-
sensitivity of knowing who, using conceptual covers proposed by Aloni (2001).
15 On the other hand, a slightly different axiom holds intuitively: knowing whether ϕ ↔ ψ and
knowing whether ϕ does entail knowing whether ψ .
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• Knowing what: interaction axioms between knowing that and the new modal-
ity, conditionalization of the new modality, asymmetry between syntax and se-
mantics and the techniques to restore the symmetry, and a new update operation;
• Knowing how: philosophically inspired language design, AI inspired semantics
design, epistemic models without epistemic relations, and techniques of com-
pleteness proof when x is not unique (nor first-order) to make ∃xKϕ(x) true.
Impatient readers who only want to see one example may jump to Section 4.2 on
a logic of knowing what since it is the most representative one for the proposed
approach. In the following examples, we will focus on the ideas behind definitions
and results rather than technical details, which can be found in the cited papers.
4.1 Knowing whether
The logic of knowing-whether is perhaps the closest knowing-wh friend of the
standard epistemic logic, yet it can already demonstrate many shared features of
the logics of knowing-wh. Although it is clear that knowing whether ϕ (Kwiϕ)
is equivalent to knowing that ϕ or knowing that ¬ϕ , introducing the knowing
whether operator firstly has an advantage in succinctness, as van Ditmarsch et al
(2014) showed. In many epistemic puzzles such as muddy children, the goal and
the preconditions of actions are often formulated as knowing whether formulas.
As a philosophical example, van Ditmarsch et al (2012a) showed that although it is
not possible to know every true proposition according to Fitch’s paradox based on
Moore sentences,16 everything is eventually knowable in terms of knowing whether
it is true (the truth value may have changed). It also makes sense to iterate the know-
ing whether operators of different agents to succinctly capture the higher-order ob-
servability of agents towards each other, e.g., I know whether you know whether p
although I do not know whether p (cf. e.g., the sees operator by Herzig et al (2015)).
As a technical example, Hart et al (1996) made use of the alternations of knowing
whether operators to neatly build 2ℵ0 many mutually inconsistent knowledge states
of two agents, which greatly simplified a previous construction by Aumann (1989)
using knowing that operators. The construction of Hart et al (1996) relies on an in-
tuitive axiom about knowing whether: Kwiϕ ↔ Kwi¬ϕ . Now, what is the complete
axiomatic system for the logic of knowing whether, where Kwi is the only primit-
ive modality? How is the expressivity of this logic compared to that of the standard
epistemic /modal logic?
Actually, such technical questions have been partly addressed under the name of
non-contingency logic where the modality symbol ∆ takes the place of Kw, which
we will follow from now on. Indeed, if you view the modal operator ✷ as a ne-
cessity operator then ∆ϕ := ✷ϕ ∨✷¬ϕ says that ϕ is not contingent. In differ-
16 Fitch proved that you cannot know all the truths, e.g., p∧¬Ki p is not knowable by i, which is
demonstrated by the inconsistent Moore sentence: Ki(p∧¬Ki p) in the basic epistemic logic, see
(Fitch, 1963).
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ent contexts this operator has different readings. In the context of alethic modal-
ity, the study of contingency logic goes back to Montgomery and Routley (1966)
and involves the works of many well-known logicians;17 in the epistemic context,
it amounts to knowing whether,18 and its negation amounts to a notion of ignor-
ance (van der Hoek and Lomuscio, 2004); in the doxastic setting, ∆ϕ says that the
agent is opinionated about ϕ ; in the deontic setting, ¬∆ϕ means moral indiffer-
ence (Von Wright, 1951); in the proof theoretical context, ¬∆ϕ means that ϕ is
undecided (Zolin, 2001). In different settings, different frame conditions may be
imposed, thus it is interesting to see how the logic behaves over different frame
classes, as in standard modal logic. In the following, let us get a taste of this simple
yet interesting language by looking into a few formal results.
4.1.1 Language, semantics and expressivity
Following the tradition in non-contingency logic, call the following language NCL:
ϕ ::=⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | ∆iϕ
where p∈ P and i∈ I. It is interpreted on Kripke models M = 〈S,{→i| i∈ I},V 〉:19
M ,s  ∆iϕ ⇔ for all t1, t2 such that s→i t1,s→i t2 : (M , t1  ϕ ⇔M , t2  ϕ)
⇔ either for all t s.t. s→i t : M , t  ϕ or for all t s.t. s→i t : M , t 2 ϕ
Note that we do not impose any properties on the frames unless specified. NCL is
clearly no more expressive than the standard modal logic (ML) since we can define
a translation t : NCL→ML such that: t(∆iϕ) =✷it(ϕ)∨✷i¬t(ϕ). What about the
other way around? If we restrict ourselves to reflexive models, we can also define
a translation t ′ : ML → NCL, namely t ′(✷iϕ) = t ′(ϕ)∧∆it ′(ϕ). However, NCL
and ML do not have the same expressive power over arbitrary models. We can use
a notion of bisimulation to measure the expressive power of the logic. Let us first
recall the standard definition of bisimulation in modal logic:
Definition 1 (Bisimulation). Let M = 〈S,{→i| i∈ I},V 〉, N = 〈S′,{→′i| i∈ I},V ′〉
be two models. A binary relation Z over S× S′ is a bisimulation between M and
N , if Z is non-empty and whenever sZs′:
• (Invariance) s and s′ satisfy the same propositional variables;
• (Zig) if s→i t, then there is a t ′ such that s′→i t ′ and tZt ′;
• (Zag) if s′→i t ′, then there is a t such that s→i t and tZt ′.
M ,s is bisimilar to N , t (M ,s↔N , t) if there is a bisimulation between M and
N linking s with t.
17 For example, Cresswell (1988); Kuhn (1995); Humberstone (1995); Demri (1997); Zolin (1999);
Pizzi (2007), see (Fan et al, 2015) for a survey.
18 See Aloni et al (2013) for more general versions of the knowing whether operator.
19 Similar semantics has been applied to neighborhood structures (Fan and van Ditmarsch, 2015).
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It is well-known that modal logic is invariant under bisimilarity, thus bisimilarity is
also an invariance relation for NCL. However, it is too strong even on finite models.
The two pointed models M ,s and N ,s′ below satisfy the same NCL formulas but
they are not bisimilar.20
s : p i // t : p s′ : p
However, in most of the cases when there are two or more successors standard bisim-
ilarity works fine. To tell the subtle difference we need to connect ∆ with✷. Fan et al
(2014) have a crucial observation that ✷i is almost definable by ∆i.
Proposition 1 (Almost-definability Schema (AD) Fan et al (2014)). For any ϕ ,ψ
in the modal language with both ✷i and ∆i modalities:
 ¬∆iψ → (✷iϕ ↔ (∆iϕ ∧∆i(ψ → ϕ))).
The idea is that if there are two i-accessible worlds differentiated by a formula ψ ,
then ✷i is locally definable in terms of ∆i. The missing part between ✷iϕ and ∆iϕ
is that we need to force ϕ , instead of ¬ϕ , to hold over the i-accessible worlds, and
the contingency of ψ helps to fill in the gap. This almost-definability schema (AD)
inspires us to find:
• a notion of ∆i-bisimulation which characterizes the expressive power of NCL;
• the suitable definition of canonical relations in the completeness proofs;
• the right axioms for special frame properties.
From AD, if there are two states which can be told apart by a NCL formula then
the standard bisimulation should work locally. However, to turn this precondition
into a purely structural requirement is quite non-trivial. The idea is to define the
bisimulation notion within a single model and then generalize the bisimilarity notion
using disjoint unions of two models.
Definition 2 (∆ -Bisimulation). Let M = 〈S,{→i| i ∈ I},V 〉 be a model. A binary
relation Z over S is a ∆ -bisimulation on M , if Z is non-empty and whenever sZs′:
• (Invariance) s and s′ satisfy the same propositional variables;
• (Zig) if there are two different successors t1, t2 of s such that (t1, t2) /∈ Z and
s→i t, then there exists t ′ such that s′→i t ′ and tZt ′;
• (Zag) if there are two different successors t ′1, t ′2 of s′ such that (t ′1, t ′2) /∈ Z and
s′→i t ′, then there exists t such that s→i t and tZt ′.
M ,s and N , t are ∆ -bisimilar (M ,s↔∆ N , t) if there is a ∆ -bisimulation on the
disjoint union of M and N linking s and t.
In contrast to the standard bisimilarity, to show that ∆ -bisimilarity is indeed an
equivalence relation is not at all trivial but a good exercise to appreciate better the
definition.21
20 Note that if there is at most one successor of s then every ∆ϕ formula holds.
21 The transitivity is hard, you need to enrich the two bisimulations a bit in connection with the
middle model when proving it, see (Fan, 2015).
14 Yanjing Wang
Based on ∆ -bisimilarity, Fan et al (2014) proved:
Theorem 1. For image-finite (or NCL saturated models) M ,s and N , t: M ,s↔∆
N , t ⇐⇒ M ,s≡NCL N , t (satisfying the same NCL formulas).
Theorem 2. NCL is the ∆ -bisimilarity invariant fragment of ML (and FOL).
The proof mimics the standard proofs in modal logic by using AD repeatedly to
simulate ✷ whenever possible.
A natural question arises: if you can almost always define ✷ using ∆ locally
on models, is the difference in expressivity just a negligible subtlety? However,
Fan et al (2014) showed that in terms of frame definability it is a significant differ-
ence.
Theorem 3. The frame properties of seriality, reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry, and
Euclidicity are not definable in NCL.
The proof by Fan et al (2014) uses the following frames:
F1 s1 // t // u F2 s2

It can be shown that F1  ϕ ⇐⇒ F2  ϕ for all NCL-formula ϕ , based on the
invariance under ∆ -bisimilarity and possible valuations over the frames. However,
the left frame is not reflexive (transitive, serial, symmetric and Euclidean) while the
right one has all these properties. Therefore such frame properties are not defin-
able. This presents a sharp difference between NCL and ML, and this may cause
difficulties in axiomatizing NCL over different frame classes.
4.1.2 Axiomatizations
In axiomatizing NCL over different frame classes to apply it in different contexts,
we apparently face the following difficulties:
• It is impossible to use NCL formulas to capture frame properties.
• NCL is not normal, e.g., ∆i(ϕ →ψ)∧∆iϕ →∆iψ is invalid, as mentioned before.
• NCL is also not strictly weaker than modal logic, i.e. ∆iϕ ↔ ∆i¬ϕ is valid.
The following system SNCL is proposed by Fan et al (2014, 2015)22
System SNCL
Axioms Rules
TAUT all the instances of tautologies MP ϕ ,ϕ → ψψ
KwCon ∆i(q→ p)∧∆i(¬q → p)→ ∆i p NEC
ϕ
∆iϕ
KwDis ∆i p→ ∆i(p→ q)∨∆i(¬p → q) SUB
ϕ
ϕ [p/ψ ]
Kw↔ ∆i p↔ ∆i¬p REPL
ϕ ↔ ψ
∆iϕ ↔ ∆iψ
22 See Fan et al (2015) for comparisons with other equivalent systems in the literature.
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KwCon tells us how to derive ∆iϕ , and KwDis tells us how to derive from ∆iϕ .
KwCon is actually useful if we take it as a guide for the questioning strategy aiming
at knowing whether p (cf. e.g., (Liu and Wang, 2013)). Imagine that a student i
wants to know whether he has passed the exam (p) or not, but does not want to ask
the teacher directly. According to the axiom, he can ask the teacher two apparently
innocent questions related to whether someone else (say j) has passed the exam (q):
(1) “Is it the case that j or I passed the exam?” (to obtain ∆i(q∨ p), i.e., ∆i(¬q→ p))
and (2) “Is it the case that if j passes then I pass too?” (to obtain ∆i(q → p)). By
axiom KwCon, ∆i p then holds.23 Note that since the distribution axiom no longer
holds for ∆i, we need the replacement rule REPL to facilitate the substitution of
equivalent formulas.
Theorem 4 (Fan et al (2015)). SNCL is sound and strongly complete w.r.t. NCL
over the class of arbitrary frames.
The completeness proof is based on the following canonical model construction,
inspired by the almost-definability schema again.
Definition 3 (Canonical model). Define M c = 〈Sc,Rc,V c〉 as follows:
• Sc = {s | s is a maximal consistent set of SNCL}
• For all s, t ∈ Sc, sRci t iff there exists χ such that:
– ¬∆iχ ∈ s, and
– for all ϕ , ∆iϕ ∧∆i(χ → ϕ) ∈ s implies ϕ ∈ t.
• V c(p) = {s ∈ Sc | p ∈ s}.
Readers who are familiar with modal logic can immediately see the similarity to
the standard definition of canonical relations: ∆iϕ ∧∆i(χ → ϕ) acts as ✷iϕ given
¬∆iχ ∈ s. Note that if ∆iχ ∈ s for every NCL-formula χ then there is simply no
need to have an outgoing arrow from s.
In the proof of the truth lemma, the hard part is to show that ∆iψ 6∈ s im-
plies M c,s 2 ∆iψ . Here it is worthwhile to stress a characteristic feature which
is shared by some other knowing-wh logics. Note that to show M c,s 2 ∆iψ (exist-
ence lemma), we need to construct two successors of s such that ψ holds on one and
does not hold on the other. Bearing the schema AD in mind, it boils down to show
the following two sets are consistent, which can be proved using the axioms:
1. {ϕ | ∆iϕ ∧∆i(ψ → ϕ) ∈ s}∪{ψ} is consistent.
2. {ϕ | ∆iϕ ∧∆i(¬ψ → ϕ) ∈ s}∪{¬ψ} is consistent.
For NCL over other frame classes, Fan et al (2015) present all the complete axio-
matizations based on SNCL in Table 2.24 Note that although wKw4 and wKw5 look
like the corresponding axioms 4 and 5 of standard epistemic logic, SNCL+wKw4
and SNCL+wKw5 are not complete over the classes of transitive and euclidean
23 Here we can also see the parallel of deduction and interrogation that Hintikka (2007) discussed.
24 For some equivalent proof systems in the literature, see the survey and comparisons in (Fan et al,
2015).
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Table 2 Axiomatizations of NCL over various frame classes
Notation Axiom Schemas Systems Frames
KwT ∆iϕ ∧∆i(ϕ → ψ)∧ϕ → ∆iψ SNCLT= SNCL+KwT reflexive
Kw4 ∆iϕ → ∆i(∆iϕ ∨ψ) SNCL4 = SNCL+Kw4 transitive
Kw5 ¬∆iϕ → ∆i(¬∆iϕ ∨ψ) SNCL5 = SNCL+Kw5 euclidean
wKw4 ∆iϕ → ∆i∆iϕ SNCLS4 = SNCL+KwT+wKw4 ref. & trans.
wKw5 ¬∆iϕ → ∆i¬∆iϕ SNCLS5 = SNCL+KwT+wKw5 equivalence
KwB ϕ → ∆i((∆iϕ ∧∆i(ϕ → ψ) SNCLB= SNCL+KwB symmetric
∧¬∆iψ)→ χ)
frames respectively. We need their stronger versions. On the other hand, in presence
of KwT, wKw4 and wKw5 are enough to capture NCL over S5 frames.
Here are two points we want to stress (details can be found in (Fan et al, 2015)):
• We may find new axioms by using the almost-definability schema to translate the
standard modal logic axioms corresponding to the frame properties.
• The axioms are usually not canonical but we can transform the canonical model
into the right shape.
We conclude our discussion on knowing whether by adding public announce-
ments to NCL:
ϕ ::=⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | ∆iϕ | [ϕ ]ϕ
with the standard semantics as in public announcement logic of Plaza (1989):
M ,s  [ψ ]ϕ ⇔ M ,s  ψ implies M |ψ ,s  ϕ
where M |ψ = (S′,{→′i| i ∈ I},V ′) such that: S′ = {s | M ,s  ψ}, →′i=→i |S′×S′
and V ′(p) =V (p)∩S′.
With the usual reduction axioms and the following one, Fan et al (2015) axio-
matized the extended logic over various classes of frames:
[ϕ ]∆iψ ↔ (ϕ → (∆i[ϕ ]ψ ∨∆i[ϕ ]¬ψ))
A similar story holds if we introduce the event model modality in DEL (Fan et al,
2015). By having both the updates and knowing whether modalities in place, this
simple language can be used to model the goal and the preconditions of actions in
the scenarios of epistemic planning with polar questions/binary tests. For example,
in a version of muddy children, the father asks “Please step forward, if you know
whether you are dirty”. After repeating the announcement several times, all the dirty
children know whether they are dirty.
Instead of the standard announcement operator, we can also introduce the an-
nouncing whether operator [?ϕ ] which updates the model with the ϕ or ¬ϕ depend-
ing on the actual truth value of ϕ (cf. e.g., (Van Ditmarsch et al, 2011; van Ditmarsch and Fan,
2016)). It is easy to see that [?ϕ ]ψ ↔ ([ϕ ]ψ ∧ [¬ϕ ]ψ). This operator may be use-
ful in presenting protocols involving telling the truth value of a proposition such as
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the protocol for dining cryptographers (Chaum, 1988). In the next section, we will
generalize this idea to announcing the value of a constant.
4.2 Knowing what
Knowing whether ϕ can also be viewed as knowing what the truth value of ϕ is.
In this subsection, we survey the line of work on a simple yet ubiquitous type of
knowing what: “knowing [what the] value [is]” where each constant has a value
that ranges over a possibly infinite domain.25 Note that since the domain may be
infinite, it does not make sense to encode knowing the value of c by the disjunction
of knowing that c = v1, knowing that c = v2, and so on. This is a fundamental
difference between knowing whether and knowing value, which makes the latter
much more interesting.
The study of knowing value as a modal operator dates back to (Plaza, 1989),
which is well-known for the invention of public announcement logic (PAL).26 In-
terestingly enough, almost one half of this classic paper was devoted not to “know-
ing that” but to “knowing value”, which was, to our knowledge, largely neglected by
the later literature except the comments by van Ditmarsch (2007). Plaza (1989) used
two running examples to demonstrate the update effects of public announcements:
the muddy children and the sum-and-product puzzle.27 To model the second puzzle,
Plaza (1989) introduced a special Kvi modality to the epistemic language to express
that agent i knows the value of some constant. Let us call the following language
PALKv (where c is any constant symbol in a given set C):
ϕ ::=⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | Kiϕ | Kvic | [ϕ ]ϕ
We use the usual abbreviations ˆKi and 〈ϕ〉 for the diamond versions of Ki and [ϕ ].
By having both Ki and Kvi, PALKv can express interesting interactions between
them, e.g., “i knows that j knows the password but i doesn’t know what exactly it
is” by KiKv jc∧¬Kvic. Note that replacing Kv by K and replacing constant c by a
proposition p will result in an inconsistent formula KiK j p∧¬Ki p.28
In contrast to the in-depth study of public announcement logic, Plaza did not give
the axiomatization of the above logic with both announcement and the Kv operator
but only a few axioms on top of S5, and this was the starting point of the study by
25 As we mentioned earlier, knowing the value can be seen as knowing the answer to a concealed
question, see Aloni and Roelofsen (2011) and references therein for some recent discussions.
26 A similar definition of the knowing value modal operator appeared earlier in Ma and Guo (1983)
as an abbreviation in a setting of quantified epistemic logic.
27 Two people S and P are told respectively the sum and product of two natural numbers which are
known to be below 100. The following conversation happens: P says: “I do not know the numbers.”
S says: “I knew you didn’t.” P says: “I now know the numbers.” S says: “I now also know it.”
28 On the other hand, replacing Kv with the knowing whether operator results in a consistent
formula.
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Wang and Fan (2013). It turns out that those axioms are not enough to capture the
logic w.r.t. the semantics we mentioned at the beginning of Section 4 for Kvi:
Theorem 5 (Wang and Fan (2013)). The valid formula 〈p〉Kvic∧〈q〉Kvic → 〈p∨
q〉Kvic is not derivable in the S5 system with Plaza’s new axioms.
By defining a suitable bisimulation notion, Wang and Fan (2013) showed that
PALKv is not reducible to its announcement-free fragment ELKv, thus the standard
reductive-technique of dynamic epistemic logic cannot work here: you can never use
reduction axioms to capture the logic of PALKv based on a system of the epistemic
logic with Kvi but not announcements.29 In the following, we propose an apparently
more general conditional Kvi operator that can encode the public announcements
with reduction axioms. We believe the generalized operators constitute a language
which is easier to use.
4.2.1 Language, semantics and expressivity
We start with a conditional generalization of Kvi operator introduced by Wang and Fan
(2013) (call the language ELKvr where r means “relativized”):
ϕ ::=⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | Kiϕ | Kvi(ϕ ,c)
where Kvi(ϕ ,c) says “agent i knows what c is given ϕ”. For example, I may forget
my login password for a website, but I can still say that I know what the password is
given that it is four-digit, since I have only one four-digit password ever. Actually,
everyday knowledge is usually conditional.30 As mentioned earlier, the semantics is
based on first-order epistemic models with a constant domain M = 〈S,D,{∼i| i ∈
I},V,VC〉 where ∼i is an equivalence relation:
M ,s  Kvi(ϕ ,c) ⇔ for any t1, t2 ∈ S such that s∼i t1 and s∼i t2 :
M , t1  ϕ and M , t2  ϕ implies VC(c, t1) =VC(c, t2)
Intuitively, the semantics says that i knows the value of c given ϕ iff on all the ϕ-
worlds that he considers possible, c has exactly the same value. The announcement
operator can also be added to ELKvr and obtain PALKvr:
ϕ ::=⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | Kiϕ | Kvi(ϕ ,c) | [ϕ ]ϕ
PALKvr looks more expressive than PALKv, but in fact both logics are equally
expressive as the announcement-free ELKvr:
Theorem 6 (Wang and Fan (2013)). The comparison of the expressive power of
those logics are summarized in the following (transitive) diagram:
29 Plaza (1989) gave the following two extra introspection axioms on top of S5 to capture this
announcement-free fragment without a proof: Kvic → KiKvic and ¬Kvic → Ki¬Kvic. Our later
language will supersede this simple language.
30 For example, I know that I have hands given that I am not a brain in a vat.
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ELKvr ←→ PALKvr
↑ l
ELKv −→ PALKv
It means that we can forget about PALKv and use ELKvr instead, qua expressivity.
4.2.2 Axiomatization
An axiomatization for the multi-agent ELKvr is given by Wang and Fan (2014):
System SELKVr-S5
Axiom Schemas
TAUT all the instances of tautologies
DISTK Ki(p → q)→ (Ki p→ Kiq)
T Ki p → p
4 Ki p→ KiKi p
5 ¬Ki p→ Ki¬Ki p
DISTKvr Ki(p→ q)→ (Kvi(q,c)→ Kvi(p,c))
Kvr4 Kvi(p,c)→ KiKvi(p,c)
Kvr⊥ Kvi(⊥,c)
Kvr∨ ˆKi(p∧q)∧Kvi(p,c)∧Kvi(q,c)→ Kvi(p∨q,c)
Rules
MP
ϕ ,ϕ → ψ
ψ
NECK
ϕ
Kiϕ
SUB
ϕ
ϕ [p/ψ ]
RE
ψ ↔ χ
ϕ ↔ ϕ [ψ/χ ]
where DISTKvr is the distribution axiom for the conditional Kvi operator, which
capture the interaction between Ki and Kvi (note the positions of p and q in the
consequent). Kvr4 is a variation of the positive introspection axiom, and the corres-
ponding negative introspection is derivable. Kvr⊥ stipulates that the Kvi operator is
essentially a conditional. Maybe the most interesting axiom is Kvr∨ which handles
the composition of the conditions: suppose all the epistemically possible p-worlds
agree on what c is and all the epistemically possible q-worlds also agree on c, then
the overlap between p-possibilities and q-possibilities implies that all the p∨ q-
possibilities also agree on what c is. The careful reader may spot similarity between
this axiom and the formula to show incompleteness in Theorem 5.
Wang and Fan (2014) then showed the completeness of the above system:
Theorem 7. SELKVr is sound and strongly complete for ELKvr.
The highly non-trivial proof of the above theorem demonstrates the asymmetry
between the syntax and semantics that we mentioned earlier. First note that in the
canonical model, merely maximal consistent sets cannot work. The following is a
model where two logically equivalent states are needed to falsify Kv1c, where c is
assigned value ◦ and • respectively. This can never be embedded into a canonical
model where states are maximal consistent sets. This problem is due to the fact that
our language is too weak to capture all the information in the models.
p,c 7→ ◦
1,2

1 p,c 7→ •
1,2

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The proof idea comes when we realize what those Kvi(ϕ ,c) formulas actually are.
Here, the perspective of quantified epistemic logic helps. Essentially, Kvi(ϕ ,c) can
be viewed as ∃xKi(ϕ → c = x) where x is a variable and c is a non-rigid constant.
The Kvi operator packages a quantifier, a modality, an implication and an equal-
ity together, without allowing the subformulas to appear freely. To build a suitable
canonical model, we need to saturate each maximal consistent set with some extra
information which roughly correspond to some subformulas of ∃xKi(ϕ → c = x):
• counterparts of atomic formulas such as c = x;
• counterparts of Ki(ϕ → c = x).
Moreover, we need to make sure these extra pieces of information are “consistent”
with the maximal consistent sets and the canonical relations, by imposing further
conditions. Wang and Fan (2014) introduced two functions f and g to tell the current
value of each c, and the potential value of c given ϕ according to i. Thus a state in
the canonical model is a triple 〈Γ , f ,g〉 where f and g function as subformulas
c = x and Ki(ϕ → c = x). The extra conditions need to impose the consistency
between such “subformulas” and the corresponding maximal consistent sets, e.g.,
ψ ∧Kvi(ψ ,c) ∈ Γ implies f (c) = g(i,ψ ,c): if ψ holds on the current world, then
the value of c given ψ should be the same as the current value of c.
Then we can prove the following statements:
• Each maximal consistent set can be properly saturated with some f and g.
• Each saturated MCS including ¬Ki¬ϕ has a saturated ϕ-successor.
• Each saturated MCS including ¬Kvi(ϕ ,c) has two saturated ϕ-successors which
disagree on the value of c.
As in the case of knowing whether, the last “existence lemma” requires us to
build two successors simultaneously based on some consistent sets, where axiom
Kvr∨ : ˆKi(p∧q)∧Kvi(p,c)∧Kvi(q,c)→ Kvi(p∨q,c) plays an important role. See
Wang and Fan (2014) for details.
Coming back to the original question by Plaza, we can now axiomatize multi-
agent PALKvr by adding the following reduction axiom schemas easily:31
!ATOM 〈ψ〉p↔ (ψ ∧ p)
!NEG 〈ψ〉¬ϕ ↔ (ψ ∧¬〈ψ〉ϕ)
!CON 〈ψ〉(ϕ ∧ χ)↔ (〈ψ〉ϕ ∧〈ψ〉χ)
!K 〈ψ〉Kiϕ ↔ (ψ ∧Ki(ψ → 〈ψ〉ϕ))
!Kvr 〈ϕ〉Kvi(ψ ,c)↔ (ϕ ∧Kvi(〈ϕ〉ψ ,c))
Note that the specific values do not show in the language, and this gives us the hope
to build models with a small domain and a small set of possible worlds for each
satisfiable ELKvr formulas. It can be shown that ELKvr is not only decidable but
with a complexity not higher than standard modal logic.32
Theorem 8 (Ding (2015)). ELKvr over arbitrary models is PSPACE-complete.
31 Uniform substitution does not work for these new schemas.
32 The decidability of ELKvr over epistemic models was shown by Xiong (2014).
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4.2.3 Simplification of the semantics
As we mentioned, the models for ELKvr are rich, but the language is quite weak,
thus some information in the model cannot be expressed. To restore the symmetry
between semantics and syntax, we may try to simplify the models while keeping
the same logic intact (valid formulas). As we will see, the simplified semantics may
sharpen our understanding of the logic and facilitate further technical discussions.
Let us start with a simple but crucial observation that we already touched im-
plicitly in the discussion of the completeness proof: ¬Kvi(ϕ ,c) can be viewed as a
special diamond formula, since it says that there are two i-accessible ϕ-worlds that
do not agree on the value of c.33 Note that the semantics does not really rely on
the exact value of c on each world, but it does depend on whether c has the same
value. This inspires Gu and Wang (2016) to propose a simplified semantics, which
interprets the corresponding diamond ✸ci w.r.t. a ternary relation Rci in the Kripke
models, where sRci uv intuitively means that u, v are two i-successors of s, which do
not agree on the value of c.34
Let us consider the following language MLKvr(essentially a disguised rewritten
version of ELKvr by replacing Ki with ✷i, and ¬Kvi with ✸ci )
ϕ ::=⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) |✷iϕ |✸ci ϕ
The models are propositional Kripke models with both binary and ternary rela-
tions 〈S,{→i: i∈ I},{Rci : i∈ I,c∈C},V 〉, where→i is as before for the✷i operator.
To simplify discussions, we do not assume →i to be an equivalence relation in this
subsection. The semantics for ✸ci ϕ is as follows:
M ,s ✸ci ϕ ⇐⇒ ∃u,v : such that sRci uv,M ,u  ϕ and M ,v  ϕ
To maintain the same logic (valid formulas modulo the rewriting), the following
three conditions on Rci are imposed.
1. Symmetry: sRci vu iff sRci uv;
2. Inclusion: sRci uv only if s→i u and s→i v;
3. Anti-Euclidean property: sRci t1t2 and s →i u implies that at least one of sRci ut1
and sRci ut2 holds.
The first two conditions are intuitive, given the intention of Rci . The condition (3)
is the most interesting one and it is depicted as follows:
33 In some applications in computer science, the exact value is also not that important, but people
care about whether two values are equivalent, e.g., see logic works on data words (Bojan´czyk et al,
2011; Bojan´czyk, 2013). The author thanks Martin Otto for pointing this out.
34 Instead of the ternary relation, it seems also natural to introduce an anti-equivalence relation Rc
such that sRct intuitively means that s and t do not agree on the value of c. However, this approach
faces troubles due to the limited expressive power of the modal language, see (Gu and Wang, 2016)
for a detailed discussion.
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It says that if two i-accessible worlds do not agree on the value of c then any third
i-accessible world must disagree with one of the two worlds on c.
Given a first-order Kripke model for ELKvr, we have a corresponding Kripke
model with both binary and ternary relations for MLKvr, by defining Rci as {(s,u,v) |
s→i u,s→i v, and VC(c,u) 6=VC(c,v)}. Such a computed relation satisfy the above
three properties.35 Moreover, Gu and Wang (2016) show that the following proof
system (essentially the translated version of S5-free SELKVr) is sound and strongly
complete w.r.t. the Kripke models satisfying (1)− (3).
Another look of SELKVr
Axiom Schemas
TAUT all the instances of tautologies
DISTK ✷i(p→ q)→ (✷i p→✷iq)
DISTKvr ✷i(p→ q)→ (✸ci p→✸
c
i q)
Kvr⊥ ¬✸ci⊥
Kvr∨ ✸i(p∧q)∧✸ci (p∨q)→ (✸
c
i p∨✸
c
i q)
Rules
MP
ϕ ,ϕ → ψ
ψ
NECK
ϕ
✷iϕ
SUB
ϕ
ϕ [p/ψ ]
RE
ψ ↔ χ
ϕ ↔ ϕ [ψ/χ ]
We can massage the system into an equivalent form to make it look more famil-
iar by adding the necessitation rule NECKvr, deleting the Kvr⊥, and changing the
shape of DISTKvr (see (Gu and Wang, 2016) for the proof of equivalence):
Massaged SELKVr
Axiom Schemas
TAUT all the instances of tautologies
DISTK ✷i(p→ q)→ (✷i p→✷iq)
DISTKvr ✷i(p→ q)→ (✷ci p→✷
c
i q)
Kvr∨ ✸i(p∧q)∧✸ci (p∨q)→ (✸ci p∨✸ci q)
Rules
MP
ϕ ,ϕ → ψ
ψ
NECK
ϕ
✷iϕ
NECKvr
ϕ
✷
c
i ϕ
SUB
ϕ
ϕ [p/ψ ]
RE
ψ ↔ χ
ϕ ↔ ϕ [ψ/χ ]
It seems that ✷ci (the dual of ✸ci ) almost behaves just like a normal modality.
However, the distribution axiom ✷ci (p → q)→ (✷ci p → ✷ci q) is not valid. This is
because✸ci is essentially a binary diamond, but we force the two arguments to be the
same! To restore the normality, we can consider the following language: (MLKvb):
35 Clearly the corresponding models also satisfy more properties, such as sRci uv only if v 6= u.
However, (1)-(3) are enough to keep the logic intact, see (Gu and Wang, 2016) for details.
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ϕ ::=⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | ✷iϕ |✸ci (ϕ ,ϕ)
which allow formulas ✸ci (ϕ ,ψ) where ϕ 6= ψ . ✸ci (ϕ ,ψ) intuitively says that there
are two i-successors such that one satisfies ϕ and the other satisfies ψ and they do
not agree on the value of c. The semantics is now standard for a binary modality:
M ,s ✸ci (ϕ ,ψ) ⇐⇒ ∃u,v : such that sRci uv,M ,u  ϕ and M ,v  ψ
Surprisingly, the above language MLKvb is equally expressive as MLKvr under
the key observation by Gu and Wang (2016) that ✸ci (ϕ ,ψ) is equivalent to the to
the disjunction of the following three formulas:
1. ✸ci ϕ ∧✸iψ
2. ✸ci ψ ∧✸iϕ
3. ✸iϕ ∧✸iψ ∧¬✸ci ϕ ∧¬✸ci ψ ∧✸ci (ϕ ∨ψ)
Now it is clear that MLKvb over Kripke models with binary and ternary relations is
just a normal modal logic, which also means that MLKvr (and thus ELKvr) can be
viewed as a disguised normal modal logic qua expressivity. Now the axiomatization
and other technical issues can be largely simplified by using standard techniques.
Gu and Wang (2016) showed the completeness of the following normal modal logic
system using standard techniques,36 where SYM, INC and ATEUC capture exactly
the three properties respectively.37
System SMLKVb
Axiom Schemas
TAUT all the instances of tautologies
DISTK ✷i(p → q)→ (✷i p→ ✷iq)
DISTKvb ✷ci (p→ q,r)→ (✷
c
i (p,r)→✷
c
i (q,r))
SYM ✷ci (p,q)→✷ci (q, p)
INC ✸ci (p,q)→✸ip
ATEUC ✸ci (p,q)∧✸ir →✸
c
i (p,r)∨✸
c
i (q,r)
Rules
MP
ϕ ,ϕ → ψ
ψ
NECK
ϕ
✷iϕ
NECKvb
ϕ
✷
c
i (ϕ ,ψ)
SUB
ϕ
ϕ [p/ψ ]
This normal modal logic view also gives us a standard bisimulation notion
for MLKvb on models with ternary and binary relations (cf. e.g., Blackburn et al
(2002)). Then we can translate the bisimulation conditions on Rci back to the condi-
tions on →i and the value assignment VC to obtain a notion of bisimulation in the
setting of FO epistemic models for ELKvr. As another potential application, we
believe that the normal modal logic view can also shed some light on the decision
procedure of ELKvr, since the models of MLKvr are free of value assignments,
which are much easier to handle.
36 Note that here the maximal consistent sets are enough to build the canonical model due to the
change of models, compared to canonical model for ELKvr .
37 Due to SYM, we only need DISTKvb and NECKvb w.r.t. the first argument.
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4.2.4 A new update operator
We close the discussion on knowing value logic by another natural extension, which
brings a surprising connection to dependence logic. So far, the updates we have con-
sidered are mainly public announcements. However, such updates are most suitable
for changing knowledge-that. Actually, the knowing value operator Kvi has also a
very natural corresponding update operation. Gattinger et al (2017) enrich ELKvr
with the public inspection operator [c] (call the following language PILKvr):
ϕ ::=⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | Kiϕ | Kvi(ϕ ,c) | [c]ϕ
Intuitively, [c]ϕ says that after revealing the actual value of c, ϕ holds. It can
be viewed as the knowing value analog of the public announcement of a for-
mula. Formally, the semantics of [c]ϕ is defined on first-order epistemic models
M = 〈S,D,{∼i| i ∈ I},V,VC〉 as follows:
M ,s  [c]ϕ ⇔ M |sc,s  ϕ
where M |sc = 〈S′,D,{∼i |S′×S′ | i ∈ I},V |S′ ,VC|C×S′〉 where S′ = {s′ | VC(c,s′) =
VC(c,s)} i.e., the update deletes the worlds which do not agree with the current
world s on the value of c. In contrast to the update of public announcement, the
update here is local in the sense that the s matters in the updated model M |sc.
By adapting some suitable bisimulation notion, Gattinger et al (2017) showed
that PILKvr is more expressive than ELKvr, thus [c] is not reducible. Intuitively,
the update [c] may bring new information that is not pre-encoded by a formula.
Now with this new dynamic operator at hand, we can express the knowledge of
dependence between different constants as Kdi(c,d) := Ki[c]Kvid. Kdi(c,d) intuit-
ively says that agent i knows that the value of d depends on the value of c. Formally
the semantics can be spelled out:
M ,s  Kdi(c,d) ⇔ for all t1 ∼i s, t2 ∼i s : t1 =c t2 =⇒ t1 =d t2
where t =c t ′ iff VC(c, t) =VC(c, t ′). It is not hard to see that Kdi(c,d)∧Kvi(ϕ ,c)→
Kvi(ϕ ,d) is valid: knowing the dependence helps to know the value. Moreover, we
can handle the knowledge of dependence between sets of constants. Given any two
finite sets D,E ⊆C such that D= {d1, . . . ,dn} and E = {e1, . . .em}, let Kdi(D,E) :=
Ki[d1] . . . [dn](Kvie1∧ . . .∧Kviem). Note that the order of public inspections does not
really matter.38
Kdi(c,d) can be viewed as the atomic formula =(c,d) in dependence logic
proposed by Va¨a¨na¨nen (2007), w.r.t. the “team” model which consists of the i-
accessible worlds (as value assignments for constants in C). Note that there is a cru-
cial difference between our approach and the team semantics of dependence atoms
38 A similar operator with propositional arguments was proposed by Goranko and Kuusisto (2015)
in the setting of knowing whether, which can express that given the truth values of ϕ1, . . .,ϕn the
agent i knows whether ϕ .
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in dependence logic. We can specify the local dependence by [c]Kvid i.e., i knows
the value of d given the actual value of c, whereas =(c,d) can only specify global
dependence as the distinction between Ki[c]Kvid and [c]Kvid shows. The connec-
tion with dependence logic also bring PILKvr closer to the first-order variant of the
epistemic inquisitive logic by Ciardelli and Roelofsen (2015), where the knowledge
of entailment of interrogatives can also be viewed as our Kdi(c,d). More precisely,
Kdi(c,d) can be expressed by Ki( ¯∃x(x = c)→ ¯∃x(x = d)), where ¯∃ is the inquisitive
existential quantifier and ¯∃x(x = c) corresponds to the question on the value of c.
Intuitively, Ki( ¯∃x(x = c)→ ¯∃x(x = d)) says that agent i knows that the answer to
the question “what is c?” will determine the answer to the question “what is d?”,
see (Ciardelli, 2016, Sec. 6.7.4) for a detailed comparison with our approach.
Gattinger et al (2017) axiomatized the following single-agent fragment of PILKvr
which can be considered as the Kv counterpart of the public announcement logic:
ϕ ::=⊤ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | Kv c | [c]ϕ
However the axiomatization of the full PILKvr is still open. On the other hand,
Baltag (2016) proposed a very general language with a similar conditional operator
K{t1,...,tn}i where ti are terms that can contain function symbols over variables and
formulas. K{t1,...,tn}i t says that i knows the value of t if he or she is given the values of
t1, . . . , tn. A distinct feature of this language, compared to the Kv-based languages,
is that it also includes equalities of terms as atomic formulas in order to obtain a
complete axiomatization. It is shown that this language can pre-encode the public
inspection operators and it is decidable.
4.3 Knowing how
Last but not the least, we will look at a logic of a particular kind of knowing how
proposed and studied by Wang (2015a).39 Compared to the previous two cases, it
has a couple of special features worth mentioning:
• There is no consensus on the logical language and the semantics of the logic of
knowing how.
• As we will see, although the knowing how formulas still follow roughly the gen-
eral shape of ∃x✷ϕ(x), the existential quantifier is not really a first-order one.
• Contrary to the previous cases of knowing whether and knowing what, there can
be more than one x that can make ✷ϕ(x) true in the knowing how case, and this
requires new techniques in the completeness proof.
• Our model is no longer based on epistemic models with epistemic relations.
39 The extended full version will appear as Wang (2017).
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Knowing how is frequently discussed in epistemology and in AI.40 Philosophers
debate about whether knowledge-how, the knowledge expressed by the knowing
how expressions, can be reduced to knowledge-that, i.e. propositional knowledge.41
There are two major philosophical stances: intellectualists think knowledge-how is
reducible to knowledge-that (cf. e.g., Stanley and Williamson (2001)), while anti-
intellectualists holds the opposite position that knowledge-how is irreducible (cf
e.g., Ryle (1949)). At the first glance, knowing how seems to express a statement
about ability, e.g., “I know how to swim” roughly says that I have the ability to
swim. However, philosophy literature provides ample examples to show that this
simple-minded idea is shaky, e.g., can you say you know how to digest food since
you have that ability? As another example, in some cases even though you do not
have the ability at the moment, it is still reasonable to claim the knowledge-how,
e.g., a pianist with a broken-arm may still say he or she knows how to play piano,
although due to the accident he or she cannot do it right now.42 Here the relevant
insight is that knowing how expressions may come with implicit conditions. When
we say that a chef knows how to cook Chinese dishes, it does not mean that he can
do it right now, but it means he can do it given all the ingredients and facilities.
Thus in the formal language we introduce a binary modality Kh(ψ ,ϕ) meaning that
I know how to achieve ϕ given ψ . Note that ψ may be false currently but we should
look at all the worlds where it is true.
In AI, ever since the pioneering works by McCarthy (1979) and Moore (1977),
formalizing the interaction of knowledge and ability has been an important issue till
now (cf. (Gochet, 2013; A˚gotnes et al, 2015) for up-to-date overviews). One prob-
lem that logicians in AI face is that simply combining “knowing that” and “ability”
does not lead to a natural notion of knowing how, as sharply pointed out by Herzig
(2015). For example, adding the knowing-that operator to alternating temporal lo-
gic (ATL) can result in a logic which can express one knows that there is a strategy
to achieve some goal, which is in the de dicto shape of K∃xϕ(x) rather than the
desired de re shape ∃xKϕ(x). We need a way to somehow insert the K modality
in-between the implicit existential quantifier and the strategy modality.43 We tackle
this problem by packing the quantifier and the modality together in the Kh operator
with a semantics inspired by conformant planning in AI, where the goal is to find a
uniform plan (action sequence) such that at all the initial situations the plan will al-
ways work and reach the goal (cf. Yu et al (2016)). Knowing how to achieve ϕ given
ψ then amounts to having a conformant plan which works for all the ψ-worlds.
40 See (Wang, 2015a) for a more detailed survey.
41 See the collection of papers on the topic at philpaper edited by by John Bengson:
http://philpapers.org/browse/knowledge-how
42 Such examples motivated intellectualists to propose an account other than treating knowledge-
how simply as ability. A notable approach proposed by Stanley and Williamson (2001) breaks
down “knowing how to F” into: “There is a way such that I know it is a way to do F, and I entertain
it in a practical mode of presentation.” Note that it essentially has the familiar shape ∃xKϕ(x),
which also inspired the semi-formal treatment by Lau and Wang (2016).
43 See (Herzig, 2015) for some existing solutions, e.g. by using epistemic STIT logic proposed by
Broersen and Herzig (2015).
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Before going into the details, some clarifications have to be made.
• We only focus on goal-directed knowing-how, as Gochet (2013) puts it, e.g.,
knowing how to prove a theorem, how to open the door, how to bake a cake, and
how to cure the disease.
• We do not study knowing-how in the following senses: I know how the computer
works (explanation); I know how happy she is (degree of emotion); I know how
to behave at the dinner table (rule-directed).
4.3.1 Language and semantics
As inspired by the philosophy literature, we introduce a conditional knowing-how
operator in the following single-agent language LKh (Wang, 2015a):
ϕ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | Kh(ϕ ,ϕ)
Intuitively, Kh(ψ ,ϕ) says that the agent knows how to achieve ϕ given the condition
ψ . Uϕ is defined as Kh(¬ϕ ,⊥), which is intended to be a universal modality to be
explained later.
Given a non-empty set of propositional letters P, a non-empty set of actions A, a
model is simply a tuple (S,R,V) where:
• S is a non-empty set of states;
• R : A→ 2S×S is a collection of transitions labelled by actions in A;
• V : S→ 2P is a valuation function.
Note that this is not a standard epistemic model for there is no epistemic alternative
relation in the model. Intuitively, the model represents the ability that the agent has,
and it can be used as a model for an epistemic logic of knowing how (cf. also (Wang,
2015b) for a more general setting.). For example, the left model below represents
that the agent can do a on s1 but he cannot control the outcome. On the other hand
he can do b on s2 which leads to a single q-world.
s2 b // s4 : q
s1 : p
a❦❦
55❦❦❦
a
❙❙
))❙❙❙
s3
s1 : p,r a // s3 b // s5 : q
s2 : p b // s4 a // s6 : q
Intuitively, given only p, the agent should not know how to reach q in the above two
models: although ab leads to q in the left model, a cannot control the result of a; he
may fail to continue to do b after doing a. For the right model, although the agent
can do ab to reach q on s1 and do ba to reach q on s2, he does not know where he is
exactly given only p, and thus does not have a uniform plan which can always work.
We flesh out such intuition in the following semantics:
M , s  Kh(ψ,ϕ) ⇔ there exists an action sequence σ ∈ A∗ such that for all M , s′  ψ :
(1) σ is strongly executable at s′, and
(2) for all t if s′ σ→ t then M , t  ϕ
28 Yanjing Wang
where σ = a1 . . .an is strongly executable at s′ if s′ has at least one a1-successor and
for any 1≤ k < n and any t, s′ a1...ak→ t implies that t has at least one ak+1-successor.
Intuitively, σ is strongly executable iff σ is executable and whenever you start doing
an initial segment of σ , you can always continue. For example ab is not strongly
executable at s1 in the left model above, since it may fail. Note that the quantifier
schema in the semantics is ∃∀ which is in compliance with the general schema ∃xK,
although now the existential quantifier is no longer first-order, and the K is replaced
by a quantifier induced by the condition ψ representing the initial uncertainty.
One can verify that s1  ¬Kh(p,q) in the above two models and s1  Kh(p,q) in
the model below, since there is a strongly executable plan ru from any p-world to
some q-world.
s6 s7 : q s8 : q
s1 r // s2 : p r //
u
OO
s3 : p r //
u
OO
s4 : q r //
u
OO
s5
Now it can also be verified that U is indeed a universal modality:
M ,s  Uϕ ⇔ Kh(¬ϕ ,⊥) ⇔ for all t ∈S ,M , t  ϕ
4.3.2 Axiomatization
A complete axiomatization is given in (Wang, 2015a) using Kh and the definable U:
System SKH
Axioms Rules
TAUT all axioms of propositional logic MP ϕ ,ϕ → ψψ
DISTU Up∧U(p→ q)→Uq NECU
ϕ
Uϕ
COMPKh Kh(p,r)∧Kh(r,q)→ Kh(p,q) SUB ϕ(p)ϕ [ψ/p]
EMP U(p → q)→ Kh(p,q)
TU Up→ p
4KU Kh(p,q)→UKh(p,q)
5KU ¬Kh(p,q)→U¬Kh(p,q)
We can view U as a knowing that operator for the background knowledge taken for
granted in the model, and it indeed behaves as an S5 modality.44 5KU and 4KU are
the introspection axioms. EMP says that if you know p implies q then you trivially
44 We can derive Up→ UUp and ¬Up→U¬Up (Wang, 2015a).
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know how to achieve q given p, i.e., doing nothing. The most interesting axiom is
COMPKh, which says knowledge-how can be sequentially composed. Moreover, two
interesting axioms below can be derived from the above system. WSKh says that you
can strengthen the precondition and weaken the goal and still know how; POSTKh is
a recursive way of expressing the compositionality of knowing-how.
WSKh U(p→ r)∧U(o→ q)∧Kh(r,o)→ Kh(p,q)
POSTKh Kh(r,Kh(p,q)∧ p)→ Kh(r,q)
Theorem 9 (Wang (2015a)). SKH is sound and strongly complete w.r.t. the class
of all models.
The completeness proof involves building special canonical models,45 where every
Kh(ψ ,ϕ) can be realized by a simple one-step simple plan. Note that in contrast
with the previous logics of knowing whether and knowing value, when showing
¬Kh(ψ ,ϕ) is true at a maximal consistent set including it, it is no longer enough
to build two differentiating states, since the existential quantifier hidden in Kh no
longer assumes uniqueness: there can be many plans to achieve ϕ on a given ψ-
world.46 However, you need to show no single plan will do the job uniformly over
all the ψ-worlds.
In a canonical model, all the states share the same Kh-formulas, it is then easy to
prove that the size of the canonical model is bounded by 2n where n is the number
of propositional letters. Therefore for a given LKh formula ϕ , if it is satisfiable
then it is satisfiable in a model which is bounded by 2|ϕ|. This leads to the small
model property of the logic, and the decidability follows since we have a finite
axiomatization, as shown by Wang (2017).
It is also natural to generalize the Kh operator to a ternary one with an extra
intermediate constraint. Kh(ψ ,χ ,ϕ) then says that “the agent knows how to achieve
ϕ given ψ while maintaining χ in-between.” In this way we can handle knowledge-
how with constants about the process of the plan. The logic of this ternary modality
is formally characterized by Li and Wang (2017).
Having presented our examples of the logics of knowing whether, knowing what,
and knowing how, we encourage the readers to go back to the summary of the high-
lights about each logic at the beginning of Section 4.
5 Conclusions and future work
This paper advocates the study of epistemic logics of knowing-wh. We started with a
survey on Hintikka’s contributions to knowing-wh, and the relevant recent literature
on quantified epistemic logic. Then we proposed a new approach to epistemic logics
of knowing-wh, which takes each knowing-wh as a single modality. In this way we
45 For each maximal consistent set we build a canonical model (Wang, 2015a).
46 Recall that ¬Kvic is true if there are two states which disagree on c.
30 Yanjing Wang
can “hide” the quantifiers inside modalities, thus limiting the expressivity of the
language in order to avoid conceptual and technical problems of the full quantified
epistemic logic. By three example studies on knowing whether, knowing what and
knowing how, we demonstrated the usefulness and the diversity of knowing-wh
logics. We hope we have shown that this new approach may lead us to:
• interesting (non-normal) modal operators packaging a quantifier and a (standard)
modality (∃x✷);
• new meaningful axioms about different knowing-wh and their interactions with
the knowing that operator;
• discovery of computationally (relatively) cheap fragments of first-order or higher-
order modal logics;
• interesting connections with existing logics;
• various techniques handling the completeness proof of such non-normal modal
logics;
• techniques restoring the symmetry between a weak language and rich models.
In some sense, our approach is a minimalistic one. We do not have the am-
bition to fit everything about knowing-wh in a very powerful language with full
compositionality and the flexibility to capture the context-sensitivity. Instead, we
start from very simple languages of some particular knowing-wh constructions, fix
some intuitive semantics which can account for some useful readings, and then see
whether we can capture the decidable logics nicely. Essentially, we are following
the successful story of propositional modal logic, which packages quantifiers and
other constructions together in modalities. This minimalistic idea distinguishes us
from the quantified epistemic logic approach by Hintikka and others, and the lin-
guistically motivated inquisitive semantics approach to the logic of knowing-wh.
Our examples also showed that although the hidden logical structures of various
knowing-wh modalities may be similar to each other to some extent, the details of
the language, models, and the semantics matter a lot in deciding the concrete axioms
for different knowing-wh. The newly introduced modalities also let us see clearly
the special features of different knowing-wh, which may not be possible if we break
everything down into quantifiers, predicates, and standard modalities in a quantified
epistemic logic.
Having said the above, we are also aware of the obvious limitations of our ap-
proach. Readers are encouraged to go back to Section 3 to review the discussion on
the advantages and limitations of our approach. We think both the minimalistic ap-
proach and the “maximalistic” approaches are good for their own purposes, and the
two approaches can be beneficial for each other by bringing new insights to balance
expressive power and complexity further.
We believe this is only the beginning of an exciting story. Besides the epistemic
logics of other types of knowing-wh such as knowing why (Xu et al, 2016) and
knowing who and so on, there are a lot of general topics to be discussed about the
existing logics mentioned in this paper. For example:
• model theory, proof theory, and complexity of the knowing-wh logics;
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• group notions of knowing-wh, e.g., commonly knowing whether, jointly knowing
how and so on;
• new update mechanisms to change knowing-wh, e.g., learning new abilities in
the model of knowing how;
• simplified semantics, e.g., new semantics of knowing how logic that can keep the
valid axioms intact but restores the symmetry between syntax and semantics, as
in the case of knowing value logic.
• alternative semantics, e.g., multi-agent, contingent planning based knowing how
logic, where branching plans are used;
• logical omniscience of knowing-wh;
• the study of the generic modality which packs ∃x✷ together, and its connection
to monodic and other decidable fragments of quantified modal logic.
This new generation of epistemic logics will open up various opportunities for epi-
stemic logicians to explore.47
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